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Abstract
This work seeks to assess the outsourcing process adopted by Philips for producing LCD televisions. The authors used the 
Resource-based Theory and the Transaction Cost Theory for analyzing the case. Based on industry data and interviews 
with ten of the company’s senior executives, this study sought to understand how the decision making process was 
carried out and how it affected the company’s activities in the field of LCD televisions. Philips has lost its competitiveness 
in the Brazilian market – it went from being the leader in 2006 to fourth place in 2009, both as far as regards its sales 
volume and value. The executives pointed out that the LCD panel is an important resource and that its supply by third 
parties represented a high transaction cost. The results illustrate the complementarity that exists between the RBT and 
TCT theories in a competitive environment that has few players.
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1. Introduction
The make-or-buy decision is one of the most important 
and uncertain in supply chain management. Although it 
is possible in literature to find a wide range of studies in 
the most diverse of sectors on how to make a decision 
about whether to make or buy (Drtina, 1994; Quinn and 
Hilmer, 1994; Fine and Whitney, 1996, Chesbrough and 
Teece, 1996; Canez, Probert and Plattz, 2000), there 
is no consensus between authors on the best decision 
model. These models differ in their results when applied 
at different moments in time to different sectors or areas 
of the company.
There is evidence that companies, when making the 
decision to outsource an activity, sometimes focus on 
short-term improvements, particularly on costs, in 
detriment to the development of capabilities over the long 
term. Empirical investigations systematically indicate that 
one of the main reasons for outsourcing the production 
of a finished product is to reduce the cost of goods sold 
(Bardhan, Mithas and Lin, 2007; Gray, Roth and Tomlin, 
2008, Woollacott, 2006).There is a tendency to base 
outsourcing decisions solely on current performance, 
rather than comparisons of the potential improvements 
available to the firm in the future (Doig, Ritter, Speckhals 
and Woolson, 2001). Novak and Stern (2008) empirically 
observed that outsourcing can be associated with higher 
levels of performance in the short term, but lower levels 
of performance improvement over the medium and long 
terms. According to the Resource-based Theory (RBT) 
of the company (Barney, 1999), today’s decisions related 
to production can significantly affect the production 
capability of the company in the future.
To meet the challenges arising from the competitive scene 
in which they operate, companies follow different models 
of vertical integration, depending on their strategy. Highly 
verticalized chains generate advantages, such as lower 
transaction costs, less exposure to supply variability, 
quicker response times to demand variability, greater 
autonomy with regard to own technology, and the like. 
In contrast, less verticalized models allow for greater 
focus on the product, lower levels of investment in assets 
and lower production costs. Therefore, the extremely 
important strategic decisions are those about which 
operations should be kept within the boundaries of the 
company and which will be performed by suppliers.
The problem raised in this work involves the case of 
multinational company, Philips. From 2006 to 2009, the 
company lost competitiveness in its LCD (Liquid Crystal 
Display) TV business: it went from being the leader in 
sales to fourth placed, according to consulting firm GFK 
(Growth from Knowledge) (2009). This study sought 
to identify the relationship that exists between loss of 
competitiveness and the decision to outsource the 
production of LCD panels, its main input. The authors 
used Resource-based Theory (RBT) and Transaction 
Cost Theory (TCT) as their theoretical framework for 
analyzing the case. Based on sector data and interviews 
with ten senior company executives, this study sought 
to understand the decision-making process and how it 
affected the company’s activities in the LCD TV sector. In 
addition to being a potential case to be used in courses on 
Operations Management and Supply Chains, the article’s 
approach demonstrates the applicability of jointly exploring 
RBT and TCT in the analysis of outsourcing processes.
The article is organized into five sections, beginning with 
this introduction. Then the concepts that form the basis 
of the analyses of this study are set out. The third sec-
tion deals with the methodological procedures adopted 
by the researchers. Then there is an analysis of Philips, 
with information about its chain and the perception of its 
executives on the outsourcing process. The fifth and last 
section discusses the final considerations of the work and 
makes suggestions for future research.
2. Theoretical Basis
The make-or-buy decision covers various alternatives and 
is not simply limited to making or buying. There is a relati-
vely broad range of alternative possibilities, among which 
the following are worth highlighting: producing internally 
without investment, producing internally with investment, 
integrating (vertically or horizontally), partially integrating, 
quasi-integrating (developing partnerships or strategic 
alliances, licensing, franchising), outsourcing, de-verticali-
zing and divesting (Porter, 1980; Stuckey and White, 1993; 
Wright, Kroll and Parnell, 1998; Fine and Whitney, 1996).
The criteria most commonly cited in literature fit the three 
aspects of this issue, namely: the administrative approach 
(strategy), economic approach (transaction cost) and fi-
nancial approach. In the first case, the main criteria relate 
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to suppliers (external focus) and competences (internal 
focus). In the other approaches, the level of control, the 
risks that lead to company vulnerability and the total cost 
involved in the decision are also frequently cited criteria. 
To analyze the Philips case, two complementary 
approaches were selected: RBT and the Transaction Cost 
Theory, as set out in the following topics.
2.1 Resource-based Theory (RBT)
The Resource-based Theory sees the firm as a set of 
resources and capabilities. It claims that the unique 
combination of a set of complementary resources and 
specialized capabilities (which are heterogeneous within 
an industry, are scarce, durable, not easily negotiated and 
difficult to imitate), can lead to value creation (Penrose, 
1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; 
Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). The assumption is that 
even in equilibrium, companies may differ in terms of the 
resources and capabilities they control, and that such 
asymmetric companies can coexist until some change or 
exogenous shock occurs. RBT, therefore, claims that the 
company’s exclusive package of resources and capabilities 
can lead to superior performance.
The resources of a firm are valuable if, and only if, they 
reduce company costs or increase its revenue relative 
to what would have been the case if the company did 
not have such resources (Barney, 1997). Although RBT 
literature often concerns itself with questions of value 
appropriation and sustainability of competitive advantage 
(e.g. Barney, 1991), an extension of RBT, the dynamic 
capabilities approach (Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997), 
explores how valuable the resources built up and acquired 
over time can be. Dynamic capabilities are rooted in a 
company’s managerial and organizational processes, such 
as those used for coordinating, integrating, reconfiguring, 
transforming (Teece et al., 1997, Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000) or for learning (Lei, Hitt and Bettis, 1996).
From this perspective, RBT is important in the study 
of outsourcing processes, because the superior 
performance achieved by a firm in organizational 
activities relative to the competition would explain why 
certain activities are developed internally. Langlois and 
Robertson (1995) explain that by the methods of this 
theory the organization’s boundaries can be determined, 
by comparing its internal capabilities with the capabilities 
of its competitors. Therefore, outsourcing decisions 
are influenced by the skill a company has for investing in 
developing a certain capability that will sustain a position 
of superior performance vis-à-vis its competitor.
2.2 Transaction cost theory (TCT)
The central issue addressed by the Transaction Cost 
Theory (TCT) is why companies choose to internalize 
operations that could be carried out in markets (Coase, 
1937). The main theoretical framework was developed 
by Williamson (1975, 1979, 1983). He suggests that a 
transaction occurs when a good or service is transferred 
by means of a technologically separable interface; one 
processing and transformation stage ends and another 
begins (Williamson, 1983). Williamson identified limited 
rationality, coupled with uncertainty, complexity, 
asymmetric information and opportunism in a small 
number of situations, as the conditioner of the inefficiencies 
that can arise in transactions; these inefficiencies may 
vary according to the governance mechanism adopted 
(Williamson, 1975).
Governance is the mechanism whereby companies manage 
economic exchange; in other words, this is a way in which 
organizations decide to relate to one another. According 
to Barney (1999), these ways can be grouped into three 
categories:
Market governance – used by companies to manage 
financial exchanges when they interact sporadically with 
other organizations in the market. This type of relationship 
happens, for example, when a company in the electronic 
sector buys standardized electronic components from 
a component distributor. Such procedures usually have 
lower transaction costs;
Intermediate governance – employed when companies 
develop complex agreements and other forms of strategic 
alliance, including joint ventures, for carrying out financial 
exchanges. For example, retail companies use intermediate 
governance to obtain products through the negotiation 
of long-term supply agreements. These negotiations 
often establish more advanced forms of relationship and 
customer and supplier enter into more collaborative 
processes, establishing joint systems for exchanging 
information, such as Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), 
or they even transfer critical operations closer to the 
customer’s top management;
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Hierarchical governance – used when companies bring 
exchanges within their boundaries and operate in a 
verticalized way. For example, a manufacturing company 
uses hierarchical governance when it owns and operates 
a plant that supplies products that it itself sells. A retailer 
uses hierarchical governance when it operates a chain 
comprising both the sale and distribution of the products 
it sells. In both cases, the parties involved in the exchanges 
do not operate independently. On the contrary, the third 
party involved in this operation is the manager itself, which 
has the right to determine the actions and decisions in the 
links of the chain.
As suggested by McIvor (2008) and Holcomb and Hitt (2007), 
analysis of the factors that interfere in the transaction, when 
related to the categories of governance, help in decision-
making involving outsourcing processes. Such decisions are 
essentially based on an economic analysis and seek to re-
duce production costs and maximize profit in operations. 
Therefore, TCT is essentially concerned with explaining 
the choice of the most efficient form of governance in a gi-
ven transaction that is incorporated into a specific econo-
mic context. The critical dimensions of the operations that 
influence this choice are uncertainty, exchange frequency 
and the specific nature of the assets that allow the exchan-
ge (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1979).
Transaction costs include the costs of planning, adapting, 
implementing, monitoring and concluding tasks (William-
son, 1983). TCT identifies the efficiency of the transac-
tion as being an important source of value, since greater 
efficiency reduces costs. It therefore suggests that value 
creation can derive mainly from the alleviation of uncer-
tainty, complexity and information asymmetry (William-
son, 1975). Furthermore, reputation, trust and transac-
tional experience can reduce the cost of idiosyncratic 
exchanges between companies (Williamson, 1979, 1983). 
Organizations that economize transaction costs tend to 
extract greater value from the transactions.
However, TCT’s emphasis on efficiency (i.e. cost) can 
divert attention away from other fundamental sources 
of value, such as innovation and the reconfiguration of 
resources (Ghosh and Moran, 1996). In addition, the 
theory concentrates on minimizing costs in each tran-
saction agent and neglects the interdependence between 
the parties and the opportunities for jointly maximizing 
value (Zajac and Olsen, 1993). Finally, Williamson (1983) 
defines a transaction as a discrete event; it is valuable in 
itself, since it reflects the search for a more efficient form 
of governance and it can, therefore, be a source of gain in 
transactional efficiency.
So, this study sought to analyze the outsourcing process 
from the perspective of RBT, with a focus on the firm’s 
strategy, and the Transaction Cost Theory (TCT), which 
analyzes the relationship in the chain.
3. Methodological Definitions
The research was conducted in two phases. First, we 
sought to understand the configuration of the LCD TV 
chain. The study was descriptive in character and its data 
source was sector reports and websites that specialize in 
the industry. The researchers concentrated on collecting 
this information in order to provide evidence of the supply 
and production strategies of the main players in the sector. 
In possession of the configuration of the LCD TV chain, 
the researchers then collected primary data. This phase 
is explanatory in nature, because it intends to identify 
whether the outsourcing process for the production of 
LCD panels was related to Philips’ loss of competitiveness 
in the sector. The data were collected by means of 
interviews with executives from Philips, who either had or 
still have a large degree of involvement in the management 
of the television business or the outsourcing process. The 
following people were interviewed:
1. The industrial director of the Philips television plant in 
Manaus (Amazonas, Brazil);
2. The production manager of the Philips television plant 
in Manaus (Amazonas, Brazil);
3. The purchasing manager of the Philips television plant 
in Manaus (Amazonas, Brazil);
4. The marketing and product line manager of Philips te-
levisions in Brazil;
5. The global planning and purchasing manager for Philips 
televisions in Amsterdam (Netherlands);
6. The global planner of Philips LCD panels with supplier, LGD;
7. The Vice President of Philips Telecom Brazil, responsi-
ble for the television business at the time of the outsour-
cing of the production of LCD panels;
8. The television project manager at the time of the 
outsourcing of the production of LCD panels;
9. The general manager for the introduction of new pro-
ducts in Latin America;
10. The financial manager for the television business in Brazil.
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The interviews were conducted by telephone. The script 
was constructed in a semi-structured way, based on the 
dimensions of the RBT and TCT models, as outlined in 
the previous section. These data were treated qualitati-
vely, using the content analysis technique. The content of 
the interviewees’ answers was categorized according to 
the dimensions mentioned above. In this way, it was pos-
sible to capture the perception of the Philips executives 
with regard to the LCD TV outsourcing process. 
The choice of a case study strategy for studying the phe-
nomenon is supported by two pillars: (i) the fact that 
studies on the benefits of the outsourcing process are 
inconclusive. Many studies have found positive effects, but 
others question whether they persist over the long term 
(Novak and Stern, 2008). A qualitative approach, there-
fore, that goes into a specific case in more depth, might 
raise relevant issues for future studies on the theme; (ii) 
the consumer electronics industry, especially that of LCD 
televisions, is dominated by a few major players, which 
makes the Philips case study representative for the sec-
tor, although the results cannot be generalized.
4. Case Analysis
The results of the study are presented and discussed in 
this section. It is structured into two topics. The first 
analyzes the LCD televisions chain and the second speci-
fically analyzes the Philips case based on the theories of 
RBT and TCT.
4.1 Configuration of the LCD TV chain
The LCD panel is characterized by being thin and flat, and 
electronically it is used to transmit text, pictures and mo-
ving images and can be used in computer monitors, digital 
cameras, cell phones, watches, calculators, instrument 
panels, aircraft, automobiles etc. Among its main features 
are its light weight, portability, strength, large size and 
ease of use. LCD technology, in addition to providing a 
higher quality image, has a lower manufacturing cost than 
previous technology (CRT). Therefore, LCD panels rapi-
dly gained ground in the electronics industry. 
New components that were specially planned for a spe-
cific LCD panel will be associated with the end product 
(the LCD television). This is an important factor in this 
work, because although the market has various suppliers, 
long-term associations with suppliers are important so 
that the specific panel for the project can be obtained. In 
practical terms, the panel is known as hardware (physical 
equipment) which, when associated with other hardware, 
will form the LCD television. The latter, in its turn, has 
certain characteristics that are capable of receiving cer-
tain software (program) that will make use of the physical 
components to generate images. This fact means that the 
LCD panel is a component that is specifically supplied; so 
the buyer will need to have the correct generation for its 
purpose. And according to Philips, in 2009 the LCD panel 
represented 70%, on average, of the final cost of the pro-
duct. That’s the main reasons why the market governance 
structures don’t exist. 
Configuration of the supply chain
LCD panel makers are located in China, Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan (Witsview, 2009). The three main brands operating 
in the Brazilian market along with Philips are LG, Samsung 
and Sony. LG and Samsung sought forms of hierarchical 
governance, by verticalizing in order to control the whole 
value chain. Philips and Sony, on the other hand, sought 
intermediate forms of governance when they associated 
with the first two companies to form joint ventures. 
Figures 1 and 2 show how the companies organized 
themselves to operate in the market.
Sony owns 50% of the investment in panel production 
together with Samsung, with a reasonable control over 
costs and priorities as to supplies. It is assumed that there 
is no significant difference in the cost of the component 
between Sony and Samsung and that there are not even any 
different priorities with regard to volumes. This cost fact 
is important for determining competitiveness in a sector 
characterized by aggressive pricing strategies. On the 
other hand, it is worth pointing out that all the components 
necessary for the production of the LCD panel come 
from Samsung itself. In terms of the Transaction Cost 
Theory, in addition to the specific nature of the asset in 
question, opportunistic behavior by Samsung, such as the 
non-supply of panels or a prohibitive pricing strategy, for 
example, could remove Sony from this market. Naturally, 
the partnership is based on contractual guarantees.
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Figure 1: Samsung and Sony partnership/ Source: Display Search (2008)
According to Chang (2008), Sony defended its choice of 
this model because it did not believe that LCD technology 
would last long as a solution for televisions. Philips sought 
a similar solution and teamed up with its rival LG, forming 
LG Philips Displays (LGD). This company also guaranteed 
it the volume and control needed to operate in the 
market. However, over the years the company reduced 
its stake in LGD, which might have implications when it 
comes to guaranteeing volume and reduces the company’s 
control over the flow of materials. Figure 2 shows the 
level of vertical integration of LG, the supplier of panels 
to Philips. In this transaction, Philips has no equality in the 
allocation of supplies, because the control it exercises is 
limited to its participation in the structure. Although it is 
possible to assume that there are guarantees regarding 
the transfer of the LCD component at the same cost to 
both companies, it cannot be assumed that Philips has a 
priority allocation of volumes similar to LG. Just as in the 
Sony partnership described above, the partner - in this 
case LG - is the supplier of practically all the components 
necessary for production of the LCD panel, which results 
in higher transaction costs.
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Figure 2: LG and Philips partnership/ Source: Display Search (2008)
Philips had the worst performance among the major 
suppliers of LCDs for televisions in the first quarter 
of that year, caused by a lack of direct control over the 
supply of LCD panels by its LGD subsidiary. This result, 
accompanied by weak seasonal conditions in the sales of 
LCD televisions, led to a 26% reduction in the dispatch of 
panels via the company’s subsidiary in Taiwan to its LCD TV 
assembly plants worldwide. As a consequence, its position 
in the global market declined to third place, behind Sony.
It is worth highlighting the strategic positioning of Philips 
with regard to the de-verticalization of its production of 
LCD televisions. According to reports published by SNS 
Securities Research (2009), the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) of the company has for the past eight years been 
implementing a process for reducing risk exposure 
generally, particularly in the televisions line. These decisions 
led the company to a great level of production outsourcing.
4.2 Philips: Make or Buy? 
Philips Global is a company that adopts a matrix model 
for its organizational structure and it replicates this same 
model in the various countries in which it operates. Based 
on actual data for 2008, the Consumer Lifestyle unit, also 
called Philips consumer electronics, accounted for 65% 
of revenues from all units in Brazil. In this unit, television 
sets accounted for approximately 55% of all its revenue, 
of which 70% came from LCD televisions. So, the repre-
sentativeness of this line in Philips’ sales reached 25% of 
all its sales in 2008. In 2010, with the company stopping 
making television tubes, LCD televisions will represent 
about 30% of total revenue, which is mainly because it is 
a soccer World Cup year.
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According to RBT, competitive advantage is related to 
the exploitation of resources that are valuable, scarce 
and hard to imitate. In addition, the firm needs to be 
capable of exploiting this resource in an organized way 
in order to have a superior performance in the industry 
(Barney, 1999). We try to identify the perceptions of the 
Philips’ executives with regard to the LCD panel as an 
organizational resource, based on the VRIO model.
In this sense, the Philips’ executives considered d the 
LCD panel as a valuable resource for the industry in 
which they operate, because it allowed the company to 
explore opportunities and contain threats in the business 
environment. The answers of all respondents converged 
in this sense, which corroborates the relevance of the 
panel, as shown in the previous topic.
Then, understanding of the scarcity attribute was 
checked, which was defined as the criterion that assesses 
the number of competitors who have a valuable resource. 
The responses converged on the understanding that the 
LCD panel was a scarce resource. The executives agreed 
that there are few panel supplier options in the market 
and that the same was true when the decision was made 
to outsource. The level of governance needed to obtain 
LCD panels was also checked. The executives indicated 
the need for intermediate levels of governance that, to 
a certain extent, indicate the difficulty in obtaining this 
resource. They believed that it is not possible to purchase 
the LCD panel at market governance levels, although they 
did not consider it compulsory, for example, to establish 
a strategic alliance of the joint venture kind.
Questions were also asked about the ability of imitating 
the resource, understood as the ease with which the 
competition can copy the valuable and scarce resource. 
Therefore, there would be a cost disadvantage in obtaining 
or developing it. Although there was no consensus, the 
vast majority of executives agreed that there are barriers 
to copying the resource. As seen in the previous section, 
the manufacturing of the panel is connected to the TV 
set design. In addition, these executives believe that it 
would be difficult to achieve a production level with a 
performance superior to that of the competitors and 
that this type of operation could take some time (around 
two years) to become adapted. We can see, therefore, 
that the company would need to develop the capability 
needed for production.
We also evaluated whether the processes of Philips are 
organized to support the exploitation of this valuable, 
scarce and costly to imitate resource. The executives 
were asked if, operationally, the company had the structu-
re, in the form of knowledge of the processes, necessary 
for producing the good; the existence of fixed assets was 
not assessed. The executives understood that the com-
pany had the knowledge it needed if it were to choose 
to produce the LCD panel internally. They also believe 
that achieving superior performance in the supply of LCD 
panels would enable the company to enjoy a sustainable 
competitive advantage.
To complement RBT, the case was analyzed using the 
Transaction Cost Theory (TCT). According to the Philips 
executives, the assets dedicated to the production of pa-
nels tend to be standardized. Within the terms of TCT, 
there are few specific assets earmarked for manufacturing 
panels. However, the project is exclusive, to the extent 
that the failure by the current partner to supply the panel 
would possibly lead to a breakdown in Philips production 
because it is highly unlikely it would find another supplier 
that would be able to replace the item.
In another dimension, information asymmetry, the high 
transaction costs can be seen. Those interviewed believe 
that it would be difficult to obtain relevant information 
from the supplier. The executives also understand that 
not all factors capable of generating effective safeguards 
for Philips were dealt with in the agreement, which could 
be related to limited rationality, as explained by the cogni-
tive limitations of the human mind for considering all the 
preponderant factors when preparing a contract. Howe-
ver, they state that it is possible to establish an agreement 
that clearly specifies the performance standards required 
and the rules necessary for carrying out the transaction.
Another dimension of TCT is uncertainty related to the 
environment in which the transaction occurs. We sought 
to identify the difficulty in forecasting demand for the 
LCD panel resource. This factor is important because 
environments with a strong degree of uncertainty may 
suggest that one of the parties acts opportunistically and 
thus increase the transaction costs. The Philips’ executi-
ves believe that any uncertainties that occur in this busi-
ness do so at a reasonably high level. They also say that 
the environment is favorable to opportunistic behavior 
on the part of the supplier.
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The level of relationship between the parties was 
evaluated. The result of the interviews indicates that 
there is a certain level of collaboration in the search for 
a solution to problems. The executives believe that if 
there was clearly an unfavorable environment, companies 
would be willing to act in a collaborative manner, thereby 
seeking to reduce transaction costs.
In short, the LCD panel was considered as a potential 
source of competitive advantage for Philips, according to 
the understanding of the companies’ executives with regard 
to the conceptual bases of RBT. In addition, according to 
TCT the purchase of the panel from a supplier proved to 
be a costly transaction, which supports the decision to 
internalize the operation.
5. Final Considerations
This study sought to assess the relationship between 
the outsourcing process and competitiveness, based on 
the Philips’ case. Some disadvantages of outsourcing can 
be found in the model adopted by Philips: the probable 
loss of capabilities that are important for operating in 
the LCD television segment and the difficulty in creating 
and managing legal contracts. Unlike the partnership 
established by Philips, Sony tried to build a model with 
Samsung that allowed it to have greater participation and 
control over production processes. Sony’s outsourcing 
model also suggests greater control over factors linked to 
managing contracts; since the company is heavily involved 
in the production process of its supplier, this increases 
the possibility of achieving greater transparency in those 
factors essential for supply. In this scenario, transactions 
are more likely to be carried out at the intermediate level 
of governance, as is the case with Sony and Samsung. 
From the perspective of transaction costs, there was 
considerable information asymmetry, uncertainty, limited 
rationality, impacted information and the potential for 
opportunism in the transaction studied. Philips would 
probably achieve lower costs if it were to seek another 
level of governance, having as examples both LG and 
Samsung, which are disputing the top place in the market 
through hierarchical governance.
The results of this work helped the company’s executives 
in their decision-making about the company’s operation in 
this segment. As reported in Valor Econômico (Economic 
Value, in Portuguese - Brazil) newspaper on 07/01/2010, 
Philips intends investing R$ 200 million in local production 
of LCD screens during the first year of activity. It is 
expected that 1 million screens will be assembled during 
this period at its plant in Manaus. Over three years, the 
forecast is that Philips’ total investment in manufacturing 
the LCD is likely to exceed R$720 million, expanding 
the volume produced to 1.3 million LCD units in 2012 
(Borges, 2010) .
The Philips case study, in addition to its practical relevance 
as depicted in the investments mentioned, has important 
academic implications. The article sought to explore the 
theoretical complementarity that exists between RBT 
and the transaction cost theory. The TCT approach 
is based on an economic bias and suggests short and 
medium term analyses of outsourcing processes, while 
the RBT approach, because it has a strategic bias, ends 
up suggesting longer term analyses, since it is concerned 
with future competitive positioning. The work can also 
be used in Operations and Supply Chain courses as a 
teaching case or as an example of an analysis of the make-
or-buy trade-off. 
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